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A lot of theoretical studies suggest that unobservable qualities can be signaled by 
prices based on consumers having rational expectations that constrain the sellers 
not to shirk on quality when consumers buy the product in a repeated setting. 
However, empirical tests of this literature are limited. They have not established 
whether consumers do have rational expectations of quality and find only very 
weak evidence on whether price indeed works as a signal of unobserved quality. 
We choose AA dry batteries as a typical experience good to do an empirical study 
and consumer surveys are conducted to find out whether consumers have rational 
expectations about quality given the information on price. Results validate that 
price signals unobservable quality for batteries. Results also suggest that other 
factors such as country, brand, retailer, type of batteries, and purchasing 
place alter the relationship between price and unobservable quality. 
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More than 200 years ago, Adam Smith noted that a higher wage, by giving an 
individual rank in society, created increased trust. This statement shares a similar 
logic as a higher price, by giving a potential high perception, indicates improved 
quality. This logic implicitly suggests that there is a positive relationship between 
price and quality. However, quite a lot of deviations could be found in reality. It 
often happens that, after the goods being used, defective quality is found not 
worth the price paid for it. It is the purpose of this study to find out whether higher 
price is really corresponding to higher quality when quality is unobservable prior 
to the first purchase. 
 
Compared with sellers, buyers are less certain about the quality of experience 
goods which is difficult to be detected prior to purchase. This information 
asymmetry has been attracting a lot of researchers’ attention for a long time. If 
consumers are completely unknown, sellers would have strong incentive to shirk 
on quality. It may cause no trading in the market. However, consumers can follow 
different market signals to form perceptions of unobservable quality. And then 
they will adjust their buying behavior according to the discrepancy between the 
real quality revealed after purchase and their previous perceptions of quality 
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enlightened by market signals. Sellers’ desire for repeat purchases will keep them 
from sending mimic market signals of high quality. And hence those market 
signals are trustable to a certain extent. Those market signals include price, 
advertising, warranty policy and brand etc.  
 
A large amount of studies have developed sophisticated theoretical models to 
analyze the working mechanism of these market signals especially for the role of 
price as a signal of unobservable quality. Unfortunately, little, if any empirical 
research has utilized rigorous designs to test (a) consumers do have rational 
expectations of quality, (b) manufacturers do invest in quality even if it is 
unobservable and (c) price indeed works as a signal of unobservable quality.  
 
Most of the existing empirical tests focus on the correlation between price and 
quality. And they examined a wide range of product categories including both 
search products and experience products. However, they have not verified a 
generally strong positive price-quality correlation. Besides, it is not clear whether 
the particular relationship between price and unobservable quality is positive. 






New empirical evidence from AA dry batteries on price working as a signal of 
unobservable quality is provided by this study. Previous empirical studies are not 
powerful with inconclusive results and being confined in the attention on 
price-quality correlations. Besides, quality rating as a proxy of quality measure 
widely used is far from desirable. It is not only probably biased but also 
inconsistent with one of the important aspects of classic theoretical framework 
emphasizing a single objective quality measure. This quality measure is 
unobserved to the first-time purchasers. However, quality rankings in previous 
empirical studies include ratings for observed quality and therefore price should 
be related to it even without any signaling. The overall quality ratings used by 
most of the empirical studies went beyond theoretical framework. It is a gap 
between prior theoretical analyses and empirical tests.  
 
We are trying to fill in this gap in our study. That is why commonly used AA dry 
batteries are chosen as a typical experience good to do the empirical study. Battery 
life is tested by equipment called Battery Discharger (Model EXC-2) which is 
designed specially for testing the battery life. Battery life is believed to represent 
the overall quality of battery. Hence the choice of battery allows a testable single 
objective quality measure which is consistent with the theoretical framework. Dry 
batteries could be one of the best representatives of products which are in line 
with the assumption of single objective quality measure. Admittedly, someone 
may reserve their rights to disagree with length of battery life representing 
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batteries’ overall quality. We can still defend from the following points of view.  
 
In the first place, long-lasting is the most important feature of good dry batteries. 
It is illustrated by the advertisements and the descriptions on the packs of dry 
batteries. Almost all the advertisements and batteries packs stress “long life”, 
“extra long life”, “heavy duty”, “super heavy duty”, “longest lasting in the world”, 
“XXX’s longest lasting battery”. Besides, consumers also agree with batteries 
with longer life being better, which has been proved by the consumer surveys as 
part of this study. In addition, official quality assessing organizations make quality 
judgment for batteries according to battery life. Similar equipment as battery 
discharger is used for this purpose. It also happens that some manufacturers would 
offer battery discharger to wholesalers together with their newly produced 
batteries and ask wholesalers to make a test in order to show their batteries are 
superior. This is the practices in China. And I believe in other countries people 
also follow a similar way.  
 
In the second place, this argument can also be verified from a scientific view. 
Working principle of dry batteries is to convert chemical energy to electrical 
energy. How powerful the battery is essentially depends on how much chemical 
energy is stored and how fast the chemical energy can be converted to electrical 
energy. Both are determined by the amount and species of chemicals stored in the 
 5
battery1. Suppose we have two brands of different dry batteries and we want to 
make quality comparison between them, we can apply them to the same electric 
appliance and to see which can keep the appliance working properly longer. Some 
one may argue that two different batteries keeping a clock working for a same 
length of time may not necessarily keep a digital camera, which needs more power 
to work properly, also working for a same duration. It is actually not the case. 
According to the most fundamental theorem in physics, W (energy) = P (power) * 
T (time) and Law of Conservation of Energy, if applied to the same electric 
appliance (which requires fixed amount of power to work properly as every 
resistance), the battery keeping the appliance working longer definitely have 
larger amount of chemical energy stored. So it is assured that the battery length 
tested by Battery Discharger (Model EXC-2) which is also a resistance can 
represent the overall quality of battery. 
 
Admittedly safety is also an important feature of a good battery. Normally 
batteries with longer life also have low probability of leakage. It is almost 
impossible that one battery lasts longer is inferior to another with shorter life 
because the former suffers from more severe leakage problem. In other words, the 
two important features of a good dry battery are always compatible. Nowadays in 
the market there are two types of dry batteries – alkaline batteries (LR6) and 
carbolic batteries (R6). LR6 can last 3 – 7 times as long as R6 and is more 
                                                        
1 Laboratory test should be the most favorable design to get the data of battery quality. However, it 
is beyond economics method. And the result could also be too far away from consumers’ 
perceptions. 
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expensive. LR6 is also better in terms of prevention of electrolyte leakage2.  
 
Based on the arguments above, AA dry battery is a good choice on which we can 
conduct such an empirical test. Even if we admit that battery life can not cover all 
the quality dimensions of dry battery, we still would like to reaffirm that it is the 
best choice of product which allows single objective quality measure. Unlike most 
of the previous studies analyzing different product categories, we focus on one 
product. This is encouraged by Caves and Greene (1996) who suggested that 
ample room remains for studies that are more closely focused on individual 
product market. Actual transaction prices are recorded and average market prices 
are also calculated. Both price indices are considered in the estimation. Package 
sizes which should affect price-quality relationship are also recorded and 
controlled in this study. It is obvious that previous multimarket studies based on 




No one before has ever turned to batteries3 for empirical evidence and in the 
meanwhile referred to consumer surveys to examine price’s role as a signal of 
unobservable quality. We get samples of both LR6 and R6 batteries from different 
locations and retailers. We try to cover as many different brands as possible 
                                                        
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alkaline_battery 
3 “Batteries” appearing in the rest part of this thesis all bear the meaning of “AA dry batteries”. 
 7
including both famous-branded items and undistinguished items. In the end we 
develop a unique data set with 136 different brands of batteries with 36 from 
Singapore and 100 from Jiangsu Province China. In China, the locations include 
cities, towns, villages and tourist places. Tourist places are explored specially 
because there are scarce repeat purchases and extremely floating consumers. The 
retailers include chain supermarkets, neighborhood stores, convenience stores, 
department stores, family mini markets, campus stores, box offices at tourist 
places and temporary roadside booths. Length of battery life is tested and prices 
are recorded for different brands and types of batteries in variant sizes of packages 
from all kinds of stores. At last we reach a sample size of 292 observations (86 in 
Singapore, 206 from China in which 29 are from tourist places4). Consumer 
surveys are conducted to find out whether consumers have rational expectations 
about unobservable quality of batteries given the information of prices. It is an 
important assumption in most of the theoretical works but has been taken as 
granted without being corroborated in previous empirical studies. 121 effectively 
answered questionnaires are received in Singapore and 344 in China. 
 
In this study, substantial support for price working as a signal of unobservable 
quality is established. Variations in the relationship between price and 
unobservable quality across different subgroups are examined for stronger 
                                                        
4Tourist places include Yancheng Dazong Lake, Mao Hill Yuanfu Temple, Wuxi Ling Hill Xiangfu 
Temple, Suzhou Zhuozhen Garden, Wuxi Ling Hill Giant Joss, Nanjing Presidential Palace, 
Nanjing Memorial of Meiyuan New Village, Nanjing Zhonghua Gate, Nanjing Chaotian Temple, 
Nanjing Yuhuatai Martyr Cemetery, Nanjing Muochou Lake, Nanjing Jiming Temple, Nanjing 
Zhan Garden. 
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conviction. In Section 2, previous theoretical and empirical works are reviewed 
and limitations of the existing studies are addressed. Section 3 is a proposal of 
hypotheses which are going to be substantiated. In Section 4, a unique data set and 
the collection are described. Section 5 is a briefing of the design and results of 
consumer surveys. Estimation results are presented in Section 6. The last part is 
the concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review: 
 
In this part, both theoretical models and empirical evidence are reviewed. Review 
of theoretical works help to establish hypotheses which are going to be tested by 
this empirical study. Review of prior empirical studies help to address defects 
which will be improved in this study.  
 
2.1 Theoretic Background: 
 
“Perfect information”, one of the most important assumptions made by 
neoclassical theorists, is much more than idealized and simplified (Chan et al. 
1982). With information being not costless and much more complicated, the 
problem of imperfect information is even more serious nowadays. It is reasonable 
that economists have been increasingly concerned about how imperfect 
information can lead to a large variety of market imperfections (Shapiro 1980). 
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Asymmetric information, the research focus of information economics, is one of 
the imperfect information problems. Different parties of a transaction often 
possess different amount of information about the transaction. Compared with 
sellers, buyers’ lack of true information about unobservable quality is the most 
widespread scenarios regarding information asymmetry.  Normally sellers or 
manufacturers are quite sure about the quality of the products they provide. 
Unfortunately, buyers are always uncertain about quality which is unobservable 
before the initial purchase. With updated technology, newly developed products 
and refreshed servicing and marketing ideas, there are more products with 
complicated quality dimensions and the property of experience goods. It is 
reasonably difficult for consumers to judge the quality prior to purchase. Besides, 
faced with large number of brands, quite a lot of outlets and tremendous variety of 
choices, consumers’ difficulty to make judgments of unobservable quality is more 
severe. The presence of information asymmetry affects not only the incentives of 
producers but also the expectations of consumers. It is necessary to take this 
phenomenon into account when we try to understand the behavior of supply and 
demand, market structure and the nature of equilibrium. 
 
It is possible that market equilibrium fail to exist because of information 
asymmetry. This is illustrated by Akerlof (1970) as “lemons problem” with which 
only low quality goods or even zero-quality goods are provided in the market 
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causing market failure. But in reality we are served by high quality goods even if 
the quality is unobservable before we make purchase. Although consumers are not 
fully informed of unobservable quality, they are not totally unaware and sellers 
also have the incentive to supply high quality although the quality is 
unobservable.  
 
There are a lot of theoretical works looking into reasons behind the existing high 
quality in the market and factors driving sellers to provide high quality even when 
quality is unobserved. One of the most important reasons is consumer learning - 
consumers have some perceptions about the market. Consumers have some 
observations and quality expectations for experienced goods due to several 
reasons. First of all, there are a large amount of experienced consumers who have 
already purchased and used the goods. They are informed to a certain extent. And 
those who do not have any experience can get to know the word-of-mouth 
information provided by these experienced consumers. Although private 
information leaves problem of credibility, it may help. Secondly, sellers provide 
some other information shedding some light on the unobservable quality – 
signaling channels through prices, experience centers, advertisements, brand 
names, reputation, warranty policies etc. The information provided by sellers 
about the unobservable quality affect consumers’ perceptions which are also taken 
into account by the sellers when they send those signals. With competitions 




There are some classic theoretical works trying to develop sophisticated strategic 
models to establish price’s role as a signal of unobservable quality. They bear 
similar assumptions, arguments and results.  
 
2.1.1 General Assumptions: 
 
There is a general assumption about the unobservable quality. In the analysis of 
Shapiro (1980), a single unobservable product characteristic, i.e., quality is 
assumed. For simplicity, Klein and Leffler (1981) also assumed a single objective 
quality measure. In Riordan’s (1986) model, Salop’s (1979) was extended by 
introducing an unobservable signal quality dimension.  
 
Besides, all buyers have consensus about valuation for this unobservable single 
objective quality. Shapiro (1980) suggested several examples of this kind of 
quality including durability, safety and speed of service which all consumers value. 
Thus any consumers will agree about which of any two products is better and 
preferred. Wolinsky (1983) assumed that all consumers prefer higher to lower 
quality, although they may differ in the willingness and extent to add values to 
higher quality. Examples of such desirable quality characteristic also come to the 
quietness of appliance motors and the gasoline mileage of an automobile, which 
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were indicated by Klein and Leffler (1981). 
 
Last but not least, the basic theoretic setting is that sellers choose and determine 
product quality about which buyers are uncertain. Higher quality is more costly to 
produce. Thus information under this kind of settings is asymmetric in the sense 
that quality chosen by a firm is known only to the firm (Wolinsky 1983); although 
some information about the unobservable quality will somehow reach its potential 
buyers, they are not sure about the exact level of quality. In Riordan’s (1986) 
study there is also such an assumption that the only thing consumers don’t know is 
quality prior to making an initial purchase. Hence, moral hazard problem from 
sellers’ side is raised (Shapiro 1983). That is to say, sellers are very likely to have 
the incentive to provide low quality but charge a high price to achieve higher 
profit margin. Sellers’ incentives to supply high and low quality are discussed in 
detail in the following part.  
 
2.1.2 The Disincentive of Sellers to Shade Quality: 
 
It is reasonable to believe that sellers are very likely to cheat – provide low quality 
but charge high price. Akerlof (1970) asserted that the incentive for sellers to 
market poor quality merchandise is because consumers use market statistic to 
make quality judgment about prospective purchase. This kind of market statistic 
affects whole group of sellers instead of any individual seller. Thus the returns for 
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high quality accrue to the entire group of sellers rather than any particular seller. It 
results in a reduction in the average quality and the size of the market. Secondly, 
having customers’ sense of brand loyalty (Jones and Zufryden 1982) to fall back 
upon, sellers may not feel unsecure to offer shoddy products with the same price. 
Even if brand loyalty could not be the essential instigation, it should be admitted 
that a consumer may want to continue to make purchase once he finds the quality 
satisfactory. Due to the tendency to avoid cost and risk involved in trying new 
brand (Wiggins and Lane 1983), buyers are locked in voluntarily. In addition, 
technically it is not very costly for sellers to mimic good quality which is 
unobservable by deceptive packaging or advertising (McElroy and Haker 1979). 
Due to all these reasons mentioned above, it is reasonable for sellers to believe 
that they can save cost by providing low quality without deteriorating demand or 
cutting price.  
 
On the other hand, in most of the prior theoretical studies, there is much support 
for sellers having the incentives to provide high quality although they are aware 
that the quality is unobserved prior to the first purchase. And this high quality can 
be guaranteed. This is also the interest and focus of this study – it is believed that 
sellers have the incentive to supply high quality when quality is unobservable; 
large proportion of the transactions are taken smoothly instead of being filled with 
cheating and complaints afterwards; and the quality signals sent by sellers or 
manufacturers are trustable. We are not going to say that market equilibrium is 
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kept perfect by these signals. At least, we have not fallen into complete chaos due 
to information asymmetry. There are still some clues for consumers to follow. And 
the primary force by which sellers are actually restricted and contractual 
performance is assured comes from non-third party enforcers –consumer learning 
(Shapiro 1980) and repeat purchase (Klein and Leffler 1981). Shapiro (1980) 
asserted that consumers can learn about the quality of individual firm over time, 
hence it is not a one-shot game and product quality choices by sellers are 
fundamentally dynamic. It is believable that the market will not be overrun by 
“lemons” because of the presence of interactions between buyers and sellers over 
time. Although most research in consumer behavior appears to implicitly assume 
that buyers are relatively passive (Rao and Bergen 1992), it is not the case if the 
quality determination is considered as a dynamic game. 
 
There are various informational resources from which consumers can learn 
something about the unobservable quality. Farrell (1980), Chan and Leland (1982) 
and Cooper and Ross (1984) indicated that it is possible that the lemons problem 
can be mitigated or at least alleviated by the existence of some informed 
consumers. If the informed consumers find the quality satisfactory, they may 
continue purchasing it. And it is also very likely that the satisfied consumers will 
help to disperse positive comments to other potential buyers. Thus there could be 
increased probability of repeat purchases. This approach was taken by 
Schmalensee (1978) and Smallwood and Conlisk (1979). They turned to a specific 
 15
firm’s asset which is a state variable – the stock of loyal patrons. Based on the 
desire for good reputation and therefore repeat purchases, sellers are kept away 
from the incentive of shading quality in fear of the lost future repeat purchases and 
the loss of rent of good reputation. This is also explained by Riordan (1986). 
 
By whichever informational source, buyers can gather certain information about 
unobservable quality and form certain expectations about quality. It is the 
beginning of consumer learning process. Consumer learning then involves 
adjusting expected quality towards true quality revealed after purchase and usage 
being made. Comparison will tell consumer whether to continue buying from this 
seller if the product quality is consistent with the expectation or switch to another 
seller if consumer is not satisfied with the previous seller and therefore wants to 
try others. This kind of consumer learning is a consensus in most of theoretical 
studies.  
 
The critical enforcer behind the disincentive of sellers to shade quality is a repeat 
purchase mechanism in which consumers’ expectations play a critical role. 
Consumers’ expectations formed from those quality signals which are fulfilled or 
kept consistent with real quality is also an important conclusion made by most of 
the prior theoretical models. Given the common significance of the basic 
mechanism and findings, no matter which quality signal they were looking into, in 




2.1.3 Consumers’ Expectations: 
 
One of the most important results in previous classic theoretical works is that 
consumers’ expectations for unobservable quality are consistent with sellers’ 
quality choice in equilibrium. In both models by Farrell (1980) and Riordan 
(1986), consumers invert a firm’s profit maximization problem to form consistent 
expectations of its quality given price. Thus firms can credibly signal the 
unobservable quality by committing to a sufficiently high price. Shapiro (1980) 
also indicated that there is a self – fulfilled quality level, which means consumers’ 
quality expectations will be fulfilled by profit maximization sellers. Wolinsky 
(1983) stated in the very beginning of his model that at a certain price level 
consumers expect to find a certain level of quality.  
 
Unfortunately these theoretical models leave some suspicion with the assumption 
not being validated by empirical tests. The models mentioned above are all based 
on the assumption that consumers can correctly learn and form rational 
expectations. The credibility of this assumption relies to a certain extent on 
consumers’ behavior and mentality that is either ad hoc or weak in theoretical 
interpretation. This suspicion gives rise to our study – to test the extent to which 
consumers have rational expectations of unobservable quality and whether price 
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indeed works as a signal of unobservable quality.  
 
2.1.4 Price as a Signal of Unobservable Quality: 
 
Given that consumers have rational quality expectations and sellers desire for 
repeat purchases, sellers are faced with a tradeoff between the repeat purchase 
gains from providing high quality and cost-savings from merchandizing low 
quality.  
 
Klein and Leffler (1981) found that high quality products will be provided only if 
firms are earning a continual stream of rental income that will be lost if low 
quality output is deceptively produced instead. For given production cost, demand 
condition and discount rate, the quality-assuring price depends upon the level of 
quality considered and is denoted by,   
 
P* = P* (q)                                                      (1) 
 
And the quality-assuring price must not only compensate the increased average 
production costs incurred by supplying higher quality, but must also yield a rate of 
return on the forgone potential gains from cheating. This is so-called “Price 
Premium” which can be thought as “protection money” paid by consumers to 
guarantee high quality being supplied.  
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In Wolinsky’s (1983) work the same logic also applies. There is a separating 
equilibrium in which every price signals a unique quality. Buyers have common 
point quality expectations given certain price level, i.e., qe (P). Every consumer’s 
buying strategy aims to maximize his benefit, given this qe (P). Given consumers’ 
expectations and behavior and prices charged by rivals, each firm makes 
price-quality decisions to maximize expected profit. In the equilibrium, the 
consumers’ quality expectations are confirmed by the price-quality choices of the 
firms. So that,  
 
qf = qe (P)                                                       (2) 
 
in which qf denotes quality supplied by firms. One important condition to 
guarantee the existence of the separating equilibrium is that, the expectations 
schedule which implies consumers’ buying strategies and in turn determines 
sellers’ profit maximization quality schedule coincide with consumers’ 
expectations. To achieve this condition, there is an auxiliary problem which shares 
the same tradeoff faced by sellers as discussed above. Production of quality q’ < qe 
(P) instead has two opposite effects. One is that expected profit decreases due to 
the loss of future repeat purchases. The other is that expected profit may increase 
due to the cost savings. Only if P is sufficiently high, the first effect can outweigh 
the second effect and seller will find it profitable to produce qe (P). Thus Equation 
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(2) can be fulfilled. In addition, the equilibrium prices will exceed marginal costs 
since with the prices serving as quality signals, sellers undercutting prices would 
be considered to produce low quality thus price competition cannot destroy the 
existence of separate equilibrium. Therefore it can be concluded that according to 
Wolinsky (1983), prices work as quality signals and this quality-guarantee price is 
above marginal cost.  
 
Riordan (1986) looked into the quality incentive of a deviant firm charging price 
Pd with all the rivals setting price p and q. This deviant is faced with a quality 
problem binding by the repeat purchase constraint, i.e. those initial buyers buying 
from this deviant firm should have no regret. The corner solution to this quality 
problem leads to a natural tie between consumers’ expectations and firm’s 
incentive. Thus the price charged by the deviant firm should satisfy 
 
Pd = P (qd; v)                                                     (3) 
 
in which v denotes rivals’ behavior. The function P (qd; v) can be interpreted as 
price P charged by this deviant firm signals its unobservable quality qd to 
consumers who may make an initial purchase. On the other hand, inverting the 
function which turns out to be 
 
qd = q(P; v) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (4) 
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The function of q (P; v) defines consumers’ expectation of the unobservable 
quality supplied by this deviant firm charging price P. Thus the signaling role of 
price of unobservable quality is established. By raising its price, a firm is trying to 
claim its incentive to assure high quality. In order to retain repeat purchases, it will 
guarantee its claim. Consumers at the margin know this and therefore the higher 
price which is believed to assure higher quality attracts more consumers.  
 
Summarized from the theoretical works reviewed above, the basic findings can be 
synthesized from equations (1) to (4) and presented as the following. 
 
When quality is determined by sellers and buyers are uncertain about the real 
quality prior to the initial purchase,  
 F1: Given price, consumers’ expectation about the unobservable quality is 
consistent with the true quality; 
 F2: Price works as a signal of unobservable quality; there is positive 
relationship between price and unobservable quality; 
 F3: Price as a signal of unobservable quality is high enough and always 
above marginal cost to assure high quality to be supplied, i.e. there exists 




2.2 Empirical Tests: 
 
Most of the theoretical models reviewed above resist direct and rigorous empirical 
testing (Cave and Greene 1996). The difficulty to test those models is due to 
several reasons. Firstly, the variables in the models are so abstract that it is almost 
impossible to find corresponding measures in the real world to represent. Secondly, 
even if proxies can be found in reality, there remains a problem of establishing 
accurate quantitative measures. Last but not least, data availability is always a 
problem faced with empirical studies. Trying to solve these problems mentioned 
above, prior empirical studies share some common features in their data collection, 
measurement of variables and research methodology. There are also some intrinsic 
limitations. 
 
2.2.1 Measures of Unobservable Qualities and Prices: 
 
Empirical studies examining price’s role as a signal of unobservable quality have 
to obtain data for quality and price. Since prices are observable, it is not be a big 
problem. But the data for unobservable quality is difficult to obtain. With more 
product innovations and diversified consumers’ tastes, more products have 
complex quality dimensions which are difficult to evaluate objectively by certain 
accepted standards. To solve the problem of immeasurability of unobservable 
quality is the foremost task for empirical investigations.  Basically there are two 
 22
ways to address this concern. One is to select certain product with simple testable 
quality dimensions. Another one is to find some proxies for qualities which are 
easier to measure. The latter one is a common practice in most of the prior studies. 
And one of the most popular proxies is quality ratings – scale measures. 
 
In their experimental examination of quality signals for Zeus 386 computer, 
Boulding and Kirmani (1993) took numerous measures for perceived quality. The 
measure is a seven-point scale by averaging four items from consumer surveys. 
Survey respondents were asked to rate the overall quality and reliability of Zeus 
386 computer and to compare with other brands. So the quality measure is 
basically a quality rating by consumers. 
 
Boulding and Kirmani’s (1993) work is not the only example of using quality 
rating to measure product quality.  Instead of doing their own consumer surveys 
to get quality ratings, many studies turned to external organized evaluators such as 
Consumer Report, Buying Guide and European member organizations of 
International Organization of Consumer Unions (IUCU) to get a huge stock of 
data. Since these are all non-profit organizations with good reputation and 
expertise, this kind of data is believed to be reliable and used by a lot of studies on 
this topic in top-tier marketing research and consumer research journals. Those 
publications also contain abundant information about prices which can also be 
manipulated directly. For example, in Buying Guide, weights are assigned to 
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product characteristics such as durability, convenience, safety etc. Products are 
ranked according to the assigned weights to estimate overall quality of different 
brands. Prices listed are market average prices which are obtained from various 
retailers in over 35 states in the US. Other publications or consumer organizations 
also have this similar evaluation system and reference.  
 
Gerstner (1985) used data of both quality and price from Buying Guide (Issue 
1980 - 1982). The data set covers 145 different products, some are frequently 
purchased and some are not. 
 
Caves and Green (1996) took Consumer Report from August 1988 to September 
1990 and obtained quality ranking for 196 categories. Different from Buying 
Guide, Consumer Report also included transaction prices for some product 
categories. The authors analyzed both listed and transaction prices because either 
one might expose stronger association between quality and price. It is better to 
include them both in order to avoid unnecessary exaggeration. 
 
Landon and Smith (1998) estimated the impact of price on quality and reputation 
for Bordeaux wine. Data of price and quality are taken from the “Bordeaux” issue 
of the Wine Spectator which is the world’s largest wine magazine and also from 
the Wine Spectator’s buying guide (Shanken 1993). The quality ranking system in 
Wine Spectator provides a finely graduated quality index and prices for a large 
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number of different wines. 
 
Faulds and Lonial (2001) extended this kind of study to an international 
environment. The data used was provided by five consumer product testing 
organizations located in both Europe (Belgium, France, Germany and Netherlands) 
and the US. Quality ratings and retail prices were analyzed for 15400 individual 
brands across these countries.  
 
This quality rating measure can also be found in Oxenfeldt (1950), Friedmand 
(1967), Riesz (1978 & 1979), Faulds, Grunewald and Johnson (1994). And this 
method is a main stream in research on the relationship between quality and price, 
but it is also considered to be the biggest limitation of those studies. Some of the 
authors themselves have admitted this limitation, like Gerstner (1985) and Caves 
and Greene (1996). Quality scores reported by these consumer organizations can 
not be absolutely reliable due to several reasons. Firstly, measures of quality are 
often based on small subsamples and hence may not be unbiased. Secondly, not all 
dimensions of quality considered by consumers are evaluated or paid enough 
attention. Thirdly, because some of the quality dimensions are quite difficult to 
evaluate, there is such a tendency that some product categories (food, health and 
beauty aids for which the evaluations are too subjective) are omitted.  
 
The other way to conquer the difficulty of quality measure is to select certain 
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products with simple testable quality dimensions. This method is not common in 
previous empirical studies. To pick one unique product with unobservable but 
testable quality is adopted in this study.  
 
2.2.2 Correlation between Price and Quality: 
 
The research objective of all the “Consumer Report” related literature reviewed in 
the previous part is to analyze quality-price correlation. And if significant positive 
correlation is established, it is concluded as evidence for price as a signal of 
quality. However, generally correlation between price and quality is quite modest 
if not weak and various across different product categories. And the quality 
examined by prior studies is not necessary to be unobservable before the initial 
purchase. Therefore even if positive price-quality correlation is found by some of 
the studies, it can not be evidence of price being a signal of unobservable quality. 
Based on the existing studies, how valid quality can be considered as signal of 
unobservable quality remains inconclusive.  
 
In those earlier papers such as Morris and Bronson (1969), Sproles (1977), Riesz 
(1978 & 1979), Geistfeld (1982) and Gerstner (1985), price-quality correlation is 
weak in general and product-specific. In the multinational study by Faulds and 
Lonial (2001), they did not find a strong positive correlation either. Besides they 
concluded price-quality correlation for frequently purchased items is lower than 
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non-frequently purchased items, which is consistent with the findings by Gerstner 
(1985). 
 
On the other hand, support for price as a quality signal can also be found. Caves 
and Greene (1996) examined rank correlations between quality ratings and prices. 
They found for those frequent but unimportant purchases high prices signal high 
qualities and may help to maintain high quality. This finding contradicts with both 
Gerstner (1985) and Faulds and Lonial (2001). Thus this issue is left unconcluded.  
 
A brief summary of the research reviewed above suggests that previous studies 
have concentrated on whether products charged by higher prices are indeed of 
higher qualities. To calculate the correlation, Spearmans’s Rho correlation 
coefficient and Kendall rank correlation coefficient were commonly manipulated. 
The incertitude is not only from the price-quality correlation being weak. As 
discussed before, another important respect of price as signal of unobservable 
quality is price premium for higher quality. Unfortunately none of these studies 
has explicitly tested the existence of price premium although it represents a subtle 
variant of the price-quality correlation issue, indicated by Rao and Bergen (1992). 
And their work is one of the rare pieces which can be found that particularly 
looked into the phenomenon of price-premium as a result of consumers’ lack of 
quality information. But their main purpose is to find out the price premium 
variations between experienced goods and search goods. The evidence for price 
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premium as an important aspect of price being a signal of unobservable quality 
was not explored.  
 
3. Hypotheses Development: 
 
Summarized from the literature review, information asymmetry and price as a 
signal of unobservable quality are hot topics in theoretical models. Empirical 
studies are not equally powerful with inconclusive results and being confined in 
attention on price-quality correlation. Integrating the basic findings of theoretical 
works reviewed and limitations of existing empirical studies, several hypotheses 
are developed: 
 
 H1: Batteries charged by higher prices would have longer battery life (and 
therefore better quality); generally there is a remarkable positive relationship 
between price and unobservable quality; 
 H2: Price is an important factor by which consumers make quality judgment 
when quality is unobservable prior to the initial purchase. Consumers would 
expect longer battery life from higher price informed; 
 
Repeat purchase plays a crucial role in price working as a signal of unobservable 
quality. Thus it can be inferred that in places where repeat purchases are not 
important to sellers, batteries with higher prices may not actually last longer. Such 
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places could be tourist places and small temporary roadside booths where the 
sellers are not faced with long-term customers. With rather floating consumers, 
sellers’ incentive to cheat is instigated. Therefore quality signals could be very 
weak and hence not trustable. 
 
 H3a: Price – quality relationship could be very weak or even negative at 
tourist places or small temporary roadside booths5. There could be no 
statistically significant relationship between price and unobservable quality 
at those abnormal places. 
 
Although we are following the classic theoretical works to analyze the non-third 
party enforcer which makes sure higher quality is supplied at higher price, it is not 
a good idea to totally ignore the third party (could be government or consumers 
right protection organization) when we do empirical testing. It is reasonable that in 
more developed countries with more mature market regulation, consumers may 
enjoy a better market order thus less cheatings by sellers. Enlightened by the 
statement in Akerlof (1970): “Business in under-developed countries is difficult”, 
the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
 H3b: The relationship between price and unobservable quality could be 
weaker in developing country (China) than that in developed country 
                                                        
5 Tourist places or small temporary roadside booths are generalized as “abnormal places” when 




Most of the previous studies focus on market in the US or Europe – all are highly 
developed countries. We are looking into Asian countries - China and Singapore.  
 
With many kinds of quality signals in the market and large amount of information, 
price-quality relationship can not be isolated from other factors such as brand 
names and sellers’ reputation. These two factors are also considered when we 
analyze the relationship between price and unobservable quality. This is another 
extension we are making to prior studies by testing the following statement: 
 
 H3c: The relationship between price and unobservable quality would be 
stronger for LR6 batteries (higher-quality subgroup), famous-brand batteries 
and batteries sold by distinguished retailers. 
 
We are also trying to find cues of price-premium from the data we have collected. 
If there is price-premium for higher quality, as quality goes up price increases and 
to a larger extent when quality level is high. So we are going to estimate the 
relationship between price and quality with both in logarithm form which gives us 
a better idea of the percentage change and to see whether price goes up and to a 
greater extent as quality is improved when quality level is high. 
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4. Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics: 
 
4.1 Data Collection: 
 
There are two main variables in this study – price and unobservable quality. Since 
we aim to find out the existence and behavior of price-premium, logarithm of 
price is the dependent variable and logarithm of unobservable quality is the 
independent variable. Country, city, purchasing place, type of batteries, type of 
retailers and package size are treated as dummies in the estimation equations to 
see whether these factors affect the relationship between price and unobservable 
quality. 
 
We try to cover all the available batteries merchandized in Singapore and two 
cities in China – Nanjing which is a big city as the capital of Jiangsu Province and 
Yancheng which is a small city also in Jiangsu Province. Some famous tourist 
attractions in other cities in Jiangsu Province are also visited. Jiangsu Province is 
one of the most developed provinces in China where merchandise with roughly 
similar quality level as in Singapore can be found. It is favorable for the 
comparison between countries. Exploring the small city allows us to get enough 
brands of R6 batteries which are not common in big cities and belong to the 
inferior-quality subgroup compared with LR6 batteries.  
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There are two guiding principles when we collect the data. First, we try to cover 
as many different brands as possible. Second, we also want to note down price 
information as complete as we can. There are basically three circumstances when 
we collect the data for both battery quality and price. The first one is that at one 
store a new battery is found which has not been collected before. If it is the case, 
at least 4 units are purchased for the purpose of testing battery life. For each 
battery, life length is tested for at least two times. If the two results differ too 
much, a third test is conducted. And then average length of battery life is taken as 
a measure for battery quality.  
 
The second circumstance is like this. Previously we got this XXX battery in one 
big chain supermarket. And then we find the same battery in a totally different 
kind of retailer such as roadside newspaper booth or very small family-owned 
neighborhood store, we would still buy the battery and test the battery life. It is 
taken as granted that the same battery sold in supermarkets or big department 
stores should have roughly the same quality. But in those small stores, temporary 
booths and stores at tourist places, we doubt whether the batteries even with the 
same brand are exactly as good as those sold by established retailers.  
 
The third one is that all the batteries sold in one store which is well established are 
already collected from stores visited before. What we will do is to note down the 
retailer names, brand names, package sizes and prices. This is the way by which 
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we record prices. At each store, no matter we make purchase or not, prices of all 
brands of batteries are recorded with corresponding package size. In some chain 
supermarkets, very big packages are available. But we ignore those prices of big 
packages to avoid the factor of wholesaling.  
 
In the final list, XXX battery could be corresponding to two or three entries of 
battery life length, several entries of names of retailers and each retailer with 
another several entries of both prices and package sizes. Another important entry 
is whether the battery is LR6 or R6. And there is another column for calculated 
unit prices (See Table 1).  
 
Data is collected separately in the three cities. Although we may find XXX 
batteries being sold in all of the three cities, they are not considered as the same 
item. There are three separate spreadsheets each of which is for one city. Together 
we have 136 different brands of batteries – 36 in Singapore and 100 in China. We 
divided the whole data set into some subsets according to market (Singapore 
market, Nanjing market and Yancheng market). And we make estimation analyses 
based on both individual prices (directly recorded unit prices) and calculated 
market average prices. Market average prices are calculated by taking the average 
of unit prices of the same brand of batteries. For example in Table 1, this is for 
XXX battery sold in Nanjing. Taking the average of the 4 unit prices, it is the 
market average price for XXX battery in Nanjing market. If for the same brand of 
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batteries, the tested battery life results from different retailers differ a lot, the two 
results are treated as two individual observations of quality.  
 
Table 1: Example of Data Entries 
 










Supermarket 5.0 2 2.5 








3.0 1 3.0 278 
2.51 LR6
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics: 
 
4.2.1 Graphical Comparisons: 
 
Figure 1 shows a rough picture of all the observations in the data which has been 
collected. Different shapes represent the two types of batteries – LR6 and R6. LR6 
has been developed later than R6 and therefore have preferable features. In our 
sample, battery life length of LR6 ranges from 110 minutes to 454 minutes and 
that of R6 ranges from 7 minutes to 119.5 minutes. Thus all the round dots 
representing LR6 occupy the top half of the graph. R6 is cheaper than LR6 with 
shorter battery life length and hence all the triangular-shaped dots gather up at the 
lower left corner.   
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Figure 1: All Individual Observations – LR6 vs. R6 




















In Figure 2, dots of different shapes represent the difference between batteries sold 
in Singapore and in China. Generally, batteries in Singapore have better quality 
than those in China. In China, more R6 batteries can be found. In the graph there 
are quite a lot of triangular-shaped dots representing batteries in sold China 
crowding in the lower left corner. Out of 206 individual observations, 98 are R6 in 
China. However, in Singapore only 22% observations are R6. It is not surprised 
that we observe higher overall quality in Singapore since it is more developed 
than China with higher average personal income as well as higher consumption 
expenditure. In fact, R6 has been being gradually being washed out in the market. 
It is expected that R6 could be almost eliminated in the market before long. And 
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most of the R6 found in China are from the small city – Yancheng with a lot of 
observations in villages and small towns around the city.  
 
Figure 2: All Individual Observations – Singapore vs. China 
 




















The next graph shows the difference between famous and undistinguished brands 
of batteries. In all observations of batteries of famous brand, 76% are LR6. On 
contrast, 78% of unknown-brand batteries are R6. It is reasonable that LR6 
batteries are basically manufactured by established producers since LR6 is 
relatively newly developed with higher fixed production cost.  
 
Figure 3: All individual observations – Famous brand vs. Unknown brand 
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The difference of batteries sold by famous retailers and those sold by unknown 
retailers is presented in Figure 4. The pattern is quite similar to the pattern for 
difference between branded batteries and unknown batteries. The proportion of 
batteries with reputable brands is 87% sold at famous retailers. LR6 supplied by 
famous retailers with a proportion of 80%. Thus we can conclude that batteries 
found at famous retailers normally have higher quality than those sold by 
undistinguished retailers. 
 
Figure 4: All individual observations – Famous retailer vs. Unknown retailer 
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4.2.2 Observable Positive Correlation and Deviations: 
 
From all the 4 figures showed above, a positive correlation between price and 
quality (battery life length) is observed even at a quick glance. H1 is supported 
intuitively although more rigorous testing is still needed. The necessity to test 
H3a-H3c is further ascertained by the differences showed by Figure 1 – Figure 4.  
 
Figure 5: Favorable Frontier and Deviations 
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A frontier composed by the most favorable deals for consumers are shown in 
Figure 5. This frontier also demonstrates the positive correlation between price 
and unobservable quality. If consumers have quality expectations which are 
consistent with this frontier and adjust their shopping behavior from time to time 
upon the discrepancy between real quality and expected quality, market 
equilibrium will be quite close to this frontier in the end. However, quite a lot of 
observations indicate deviations from this frontier. Although we observe that price 
can play the role of signal of unobservable quality, there should be a lot of 
obstructions keeping us away from the ideal market structure.  
 
5. Consumer Survey Design and Results: 
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5.1 General Introduction: 
 
Short and simple consumer surveys are designed and conducted in Singapore, 
Nanjing and Yancheng. The main purpose of the surveys is to find out whether 
consumers have quality perceptions consistent with the real quality and to what 
extent they would consider price as a signal of unobservable quality.  
 
In Singapore, the survey is in English. Survey items are pretested among 
postgraduate economics students. Based on their suggestions, some modifications 
have been made. Questionnaires are distributed among students of National 
University of Singapore. University students are believed to have some experience 
of buying and using batteries since they are frequent users of many electronic 
products such as MP3 player, CD player, digital camera, etc. 121 effective 
responses are received.  
 
Compared with Singapore, China is a better choice to do this kind of survey where 
dry batteries are more commonly used. There is also larger variety of batteries of 
different levels of quality available in China market. Awards are given to 
participants to motivate them to consider the questions more seriously. Awards are 
batteries. If they accept to answer the questionnaire, 2 units of batteries are given. 
Further, if they give correct answer to one of the questions (which will be briefed 
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later) additional 2 units of batteries are awarded. Thus respondents are kept in a 
favorable range in which their answers should be given with a certain extent of 
serious consideration. Respondents include college teachers and students; parents, 
grandparents and babysitters of kindergarten kids; and government officials 
working in the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. These people are 
believed to have better consciousness of quality of batteries. College students are 
frequent users of cassette players and CD/MP3 players powered by batteries. 
Many toys are powered by batteries thus those people taking care of kindergarten 
kids should have some idea and experience with batteries. There has been a long 
time period when most of the government officials used beepers powered by 
batteries. Since the State Administration for Industry and Commerce is a market 
regulator, officials working in this organization should also have better idea of the 
market. 344 effective responses are received in both Yancheng and Nanjing.  
 
5.2 Briefing of Survey Items6: 
 
The questionnaires ask about: 
 Whether consumers expect higher quality from higher price when quality is 
unobservable prior to the first purchase? 
 Are they aware of the important characteristics determining battery quality? 
 How important are those factors affecting consumers’ decision making 
                                                        
6 Complete survey items can be found in Appendix  
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respectively? 
 Which do they prefer? Quality or Quantity. 
 
Table 2 is showed in Question 2 (English Version). Respondents are asked to 
guess and match the length of battery life for each battery listed in the table. Prices 
and the names of batteries are the only information provided. Respondents are 
expected to give their answers based on prices and brand names of batteries.  
 
Table 2: Demo of Question 
 
For each of the batteries listed, please choose the corresponding length of battery 
life a)-e) based on your estimation.  




EVEREADY(SuperHeavyDuty) 0.54  
Energizer (Max) 1.14  
TAITO 0.38  
POWERBOND 0.06  
Philips (Powerlife) 0.75  
Length Options (Note: lengths measured by DXC-2 Battery Discharger):  
a)0hour23min; b)1hour05min; c)1hour44min1; d)5hour19min; e)6hour31min 
 
Estimations consistent with the testing results are shown in Table 3: 
 
Table 3: Demo of Correct Answer 
 




EVEREADY(SuperHeavyDuty) 0.54 c 
Energizer (Max) 1.14 e 
TAITO 0.38 b 
POWERBOND 0.06 a 
Philips (Powerlife) 0.75 d 
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In questionnaires distributed, we have different batteries and corresponding prices 
list. Generally, if respondents make estimation according to “Higher price, longer 
life” their estimations would be consistent with the testing results. Table 3 
presented above is an example. We have 5 different combinations for this list in 
questionnaires distributed in Singapore and 8 in China. Batteries in the list are 
picked randomly from the data we have collected.  
 
Besides this question, there are another 8 questions. The 1st question is for a rough 
picture of the common usage of batteries. The 3rd question asks straightforwardly 
whether consumer believe higher quality is corresponding to higher price. 
Question 4 is mainly for a further validation of battery life being taken as the 
representative of the overall quality of batteries. The 5th question listed several 
factors upon which consumers may make reference to make there purchasing 
decisions when quality is unobservable. These factors include brand names or 
advertisements, prices, suggestions by salesperson and previous experience. 
Respondents are asked to rate the importance of each factor.  
 
Question 6 and 7 are to see whether consumers are clear about the differences 
between LR6 and R6. Although R6 is less powerful it can still keep some 
appliances with small power working properly for enough long time such as clock, 
watch and remote control etc. LR6 is good for electrical products which need 
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large power such as electrical shaver, remote-control toy car, digital camera, 
camera flash etc.  
 
The 8th question aims to find out which is preferred by consumers, quality or 
quantity? LR6 can last longer but it is more expensive. It is reasonable for some 
consumers prefer to buy more units of R6 instead of only one unit of LR6 with the 
same amount of money.  
 
The last one is for the purpose of the valuation of products sold at places where 
repeat purchases are difficult to pursue and retain. Respondents are asked to give 
perceptions of batteries sold at tourist places. In the data set we have collected, 
information about these batteries is available. This question helps to examine 
whether consumers still have consistent quality expectations for merchandise with 
unobservable quality in abnormal places.  
 
5.3 Summary of Survey Results: 
 
A summary of survey results is presented in Table 4. In Singapore, 65.7% of the 
respondents agree with “The higher the price, the better the battery”. On contrast, 
only 40.6% of the respondents in China believe quality can be judged solely by 
price. H3b is partially supported by this discrepancy between these two countries. 
In China less than half of the respondents trust price signals. It can be inferred that 
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business is more difficult in developing countries.  
 
Table 4: Summary of survey results: 
 
Question Singapore (%) China (%) 
higher price/better quality 65.7 40.6 
longer/better 68.6 73.6 
brand 42.1 74.1 
price 61.2 76.2 
suggestions 13.2 31.4 
experience 57 53.2 
length difference: LR6/R6 16 35 
usage difference 33 37 
correct estimation 46.4 60.3 
 
Around 70% of the respondents agree with that “The longer the battery lasts, the 
better the quality is”. In Singapore the proportion is 68.6% and 73.6% in China. It 
validates that battery life can almost represent the overall quality of a battery.  
 
When quality is unobservable before purchase, the most important factor 
influencing buyers’ decisions is price. 61.2% of the respondents in Singapore rate 
price as important or very important. This proportion is 73.6% in China. Next to 
price is pervious experience. 57% of the respondents in Singapore and 53.2% of 
the respondents in China would like to base on their previous experience to make 
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their purchasing decisions. This aspect also demonstrates the working of repeat 
purchase mechanism to assure high quality supplied by sellers. Most consumers 
would adjust their purchasing behavior based on their experience. If quality is 
found lower than expected in one store, the seller of this store would suffer from 
loss of repeat purchases. Thus quality consistent with consumers’ expectations 
from price can be guaranteed. Battery brand is also an important factor. Hence we 
are going to test how relationship between price and unobservable quality would 
differ between famous-branded batteries and undistinguished batteries.  
 
 
Survey results show that only a minority would tell the difference between LR6 
and R6. The proportion of respondents aware about the difference is higher in 
China (35%) than that in Singapore (16%). It is already stated that in Singapore 
most of the individual observations are LR6. Thus it is reasonable that people in 
Singapore may not be quite familiar with R6. So it is more difficult for them to be 
conscious of the difference.  
 
Nearly half (46.4%) of the respondents in Singapore have correct estimations for 
listed batteries in Question 2. In China, the proportion is 60.3%. These figures 
illustrate that consumers have expectations for unobservable quality which are 
consistent with real quality. Together with responses to Question 1 and 3, H2 is 
basically supported by the survey results. 
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Figure 6: Consumers’ Willingness to Add Value to High-Quality  
 










Result in Figure 6 is consistent with the theoretical assumptions that although 
people prefer higher quality to lower quality they may differ in their willingness 
and extent to add values to higher quality. 9% of the respondents prefer to buy 4 
units of low-quality batteries rather than 1 unit of high-quality which lasts 4 times 
as long as the low-quality battery. 17% of the respondents would like to buy 
high-quality battery if the price of high-quality is 4 times the price of low-quality 
battery. 33% prefer higher quality even if the price of high-quality battery is more 
than 4 times of price of low-quality battery. 41% of the respondents insist that 
good stuff becomes not good if it is too expensive. Thus these people would buy 
high-quality battery only if the price of high-quality battery is less than 4 times the 
price of low-quality battery. The presence of the 33% of the respondents who are 
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willing to add more values to high-quality battery sheds some light on the 
existence of price premium for higher quality. 
 
6. Estimation Results: 
 
We are not only testing the correlation between price and unobservable quality but 
also trying to see whether there exists price-premium for higher quality. Instead of 
following prior empirical tests to calculate specific correlation coefficients, in the 
estimation equations we take the logarithm of both price and unobservable quality 
which allows us to analyze whether price increases when quality goes up and with 
a greater extent when quality is above certain high level. The estimation method 
adopted is OLS estimation. 
 
6.1 Positive Correlation between Price and Quality 
 
Generally the relationship between price and length of battery life is positive. Two 
estimations are made taking individual prices and market average prices separately. 
The estimation equations are in the form of, 
 
Model 1, 2: LOG (P) = C + LOG (L)  
 
P stands for price and L stands for battery life length. Results are showed in Table 
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5. Coefficients of LOG (L) in both models are positive. t-value exceeds the critical 
t-value and p-value is very small. Thus this positive relationship is statistically 
significant. These two results suggest that if quality is improved, price also goes 
up. And hence higher price is corresponding to higher quality. The role of price as 
a signal of unobservable quality is verified.  
 
Table 5: LOG (P) = C + LOG (L) ~ Overall  
 
Model Price Index C LOG (L) R2 Sample Size (N) 




(25.1013)*** 0.68 292 
2 Average price -2.90 (-15.3626)***
0.64 
(16.5143)*** 0.68 136 
 
***: p value is smaller than 0.01.  
 
Retailers are not visited with perfect non-randomicity when data of prices and 
samples of batteries are collected. The most likely reason for some very good 
batteries being sold at quite low prices or very bad batteries being sold at quite 
high prices is the individual effect from particular retailers. In order to better 
estimate the impact of ∆Q on ∆P i.e. the coefficient of LOG (L) in the estimation 
equation, any possible selection bias arising from nonrandom selection of retailers 
has to be avoided. Without a sophisticated design ensuring random assignment, 
the only way is to mimic the desired non-randomicity with what we already have. 
Fixed-effect estimates are presented for the concern of nonrandom selection of 
retailers. Those retailers selling only unique brands of batteries which cannot be 
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found at other retailers are removed. And the estimation equation is developed by 
adding one dummy for retailer which is like, 
 
Model 3, 4: LOG (P) = C + Di + LOG (L)  
 
The same panel data fixed-effect estimation is conducted for the purpose of 
controlling individual effect by package size. The estimation results are presented 
in Table 6. 
 
With positive statistically significant coefficients for LOG (L) in both models, the 
panel data fixed effect estimations also confirm the positive relationship between 
price and unobservable quality.  
 
Table 6: LOG (P) = C + Di + LOG (L) ~ Panel Data Fixed Effect Estimation  
 
Model Price Index C LOG (L) R2 Sample Size (i) 






i= 1, 2 … 35 





7 package sizes 
i = 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 
10, 12 
 
***: p value is smaller than 0.01.  
 
Based on the above 4 estimation results, it can be concluded that the relationship 
between price and unobservable quality is positive. And this positive relationship 
is statistically significant. Higher price is corresponding to higher quality which is 
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unobservable prior to the first purchase. Thus H1 is supported.  
 
6.2 Variant Correlations: 
 
Graphical comparisons in Section 4.2 indicate that, factors of place (abnormal vs. 
normal), country (Singapore vs. China), type (LR6 vs. R6), brand (famous vs. not 
famous) and retailer (reputable vs. not reputable) would affect the relationship 
between price and unobservable quality. A positive coefficient for LOG (L) which 
is greater is expected to be found for subgroups with higher quality batteries than 
that for lower-quality subgroups. For example, the coefficient for LOG (L) in LR6 
subgroup is supposed to be positive and greater than that in R6 subgroup since 
LR6 subgroup is the one with better quality batteries. A greater coefficient for 
LOG (L) in higher-quality subgroup indicates that price goes up by more extent as 
quality is improved when quality level is high. Thus we can infer that there is 
price-premium for higher quality. 
 
H3a – H3c are tested by running regressions for different subgroups separately 
and comparing the coefficients for LOG (L) between lower-quality subgroups and 
higher-quality subgroups. Models with dummies of place, country, type, brand and 
retailer being added to both intercept and slope in the form of,  
 
Model 7, 10, 13, 16, 19:  
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LOG (P) =C + DUMMY + LOG (L) + DUMMY * LOG (L) 
 
are also estimated to confirm the significance of the differences caused by these 
dummies. Results are presented in table 7. The left half of Table 7 shows the 
results of separate regressions for each subgroup. Estimation equations are in the 
same form as Model 1 & 2. The right half indicates the coefficients of DUMMY * 
LOG (L) in Model 7, 10, 13, 16 and 19. 
 
Table 7: Subgroups and Factor Dummies: 
 
Model Place C LOG (L) Model Place*LOG(L) 
5 abnormal -1.4312 (-1.5998) 
0.47 
(2.8390)***
6 normal -3.1833 (-19.5998)***
0.73 
(23.5429)***
7 -0.2609 (-1.2227) 
Model Country C LOG (L) Model Country*LOG(L)
8 Singapore -2.65 (-6.1038)*** 
0.69 
(8.8758)***
9 China -2.95 (-21.1575)***
0.66 
(21.4124)***
10 0.0303 (0.4218) 
Model Type C LOG (L) Model Type*LOG(L) 
11 LR6 -2.95 (-2.5068)** 
0.69 
(3.4919)***
12 R6 -2.60 (-6.9741)*** 
0.59 
(6.6939)***
13 0.1067 (0.4806) 
Model Brand C LOG (L) Model Brand*LOG(L) 
14 famous -2.6 (-9.2468)*** 
0.65 
(12.8367)***
15 unknown -2.70 (-12.4270)***
0.56 
(12.3371)***
16 0.0601 (0.8654) 
Model Retailer C LOG (L) Model Retailer*LOG(L)
17 famous -2.64 (-9.2468)*** 
0.65 
(12.8367)***
18 unknown -2.70 (-12.4270)***
0.59 
(12.3371)***
19 0.0601 (0.8654) 
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**: p value is smaller than 0.05 
***: p value is smaller than 0.01 
 
For each subgroup, the relationship between price and length of battery life is 
positive and statistically significant. Thus the conviction of H1 is strengthened. 
Unfortunately, H3a-H3c are not strongly verified with insignificant coefficients 
for all the terms containing factor dummies. So price-premium for better quality is 
not established by the analysis of this data set. Nevertheless, we can still see from 
Table 7 that coefficients for LOG (L) of normal-place subgroup, Singapore 
subgroup, LR6 subgroup, famous-brand subgroup, famous-retailer subgroup are a 
little bit higher than those of their counterparts. And these higher coefficients are 
consistent with H3a – H3c.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks: 
 
New empirical evidence from batteries for price working as a signal of 
unobservable quality is established by this study. The essential rationale behind 
the choice of battery is to achieve a testable single objective quality measure 
which has not been fulfilled by previous empirical studies.  
 
Statistically significant positive relationship between price and unobservable 
quality of batteries is attested for 292 observations. With selection bias arising 
from retailers and package sizes being controlled, the statistically significant 
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positive relationship is still tenable. Within each subgroup of the data set, this 
positive relationship is also substantiated. Estimation regressions for subgroups 
also indicate that other factors alter the relationship between price and 
unobservable quality. These factors include country, type of batteries, purchasing 
places, brand of battery and the reputation of retailers. It is legitimate to believe 
that batteries charged by higher prices have longer battery life and hence superior 
quality. And this positive relationship between price and unobservable quality is 
statistically remarkable. 
 
With price as a signal of unobservable quality being generally testified, consumers 
can expect longer battery life from higher price. Consumer surveys, as part of this 
study, are designed to find out whether consumers actually have quality 
expectations consistent with real quality and whether they rely on price to make 
quality judgment when quality is unobservable. Analysis of 465 effective 
questionnaires reveals that consumers indeed have consistent quality expectations 
for unobservable battery quality with provided information of price. And price is 
taken as one of the most important factors affecting consumers’ buying decisions 
and behavior. 
 
The proposed hypotheses are basically supported. However results should be 
interpreted cautiously given the limitations coherent in this study. The limitations 
come from the following concerns.  
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In the data set developed by this study, batteries are only from Singapore and two 
cities in one province in China. Even within Singapore, the eastern part has not 
been explored. The sample size for abnormal places including temporary booths 
and tourist places is also far from desirable. It can be expected that if more 
observations from this kind of abnormal places are available, negative 
price-quality relationship might be found. It could be very strong evidence 
supporting the importance of repeat purchase to enforce satisfactory quality. With 
the sample size being augmented and diversified by covering more countries or 
regions, results would be more convincing.  
 
In order to check the existence of price-premium for higher quality, in the 
estimation regressions, both price and quality are taken in the logarithm form. 
Unfortunately, this issue is still left unclear due to the difficulty to obtain 
information of production cost of batteries. It would be useful to get the 
information about production cost and set up more sophisticated regression 
models involving price, quality and production cost. This would be better in line 
with the theoretical models. However, it is rather difficult and no one else has 
done this before. 
 
The consumer surveys conducted by this study are quite simple. The decision 
making process and buying behavior of consumers are complicated. Sophisticated 
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consumer experimental design is worth trying. The research is not necessary to be 
narrowly focused on price but also could involve more market signals. When 
making geographical comparisons, cultural factors can not be ignored.  
 
Although the hypotheses are well testified by this study, the results are confined 
within batteries. The principal finding of this study is a statistically significant 
positive relationship between price and quality which is unobservable to 
consumers prior to the first purchase. This positive relationship is stronger 
compared with the findings by previous empirical tests. It could be due to the use 
of a unique product – battery for which unobservable quality can be measured 
more accurately. This evidence is far from sufficient to confirm it as universally 
true that price works as a signal of unobservable quality. It might be better to 
consider this study as a favorable context in which price works as a signal of 
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Appendix 1: Sample of Questionnaire (English Version)  
 
1. Please list the main products for which you use AA batteries to power. 
 
2. For each type of AA batteries listed, please choose the corresponding length of 
battery life a)-e) based on your estimation.  
Brand Market Average 
Price/Cell 
 Your Estimation 
EVEREADY (Super Heavy Duty) 0.54  
Energizer (Max) 1.14  
TAITO 0.38  
POWERBOND 0.06  
Philips (Powerlife) 0.75  
Length Options (Note: lengths measured by DXC-2 Battery Discharger):  
a)0hour23min; b)1hour05min; c)1hour44min1; d)5hour19min; e)6hour31min 
 
3. Do you believe that the higher the price, the better the batteries? Yes/No/not 
sure 
 
4. Do you believe that the longer the length, the better the batteries? Yes/No/not 
sure 
 
5. Which one do you agree? 
a) Alkaline batteries are longer than carbolic batteries  
b) Carbolic batteries are longer than alkaline batteries  
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c) Alkaline batteries and carbolic batteries last the same 
d) I am not aware about the two different types.  
 
6. For which one will you apply better quality batteries, Electric shaver or TV 
remote control? a) Electric Shaver; b) TV remote control; c) I don’t care. 
 
7. Rank from 1 - 5 the importance of the following considerations when choosing 
batteries when you don’t know the battery quality? 1 means don't care, 5 means 
care a lot.  
a) brand   
b) price 
c) the suggestion by the retailer 
d) experience of your repeated purchases 
 
8. Two batteries, A and B. Battery life length of A is 4 times of that of B based on 
authoritative testing. What do you think? 
a) A is so good, even Price A > 4 * Price B, I still want to buy A 
b) If Price A = 4 * Price B, I will buy A 
c) Good stuff becomes not good if it is too expensive. Only with Price A < 4 * 
Price B, I will buy A. 
d) I prefer to buy 4 units of B rather than get only 1 unit of A. 
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Appendix 2: Sample of Questionnaire (Chinese Version) 





空格中填入它们的寿命长短顺序， 1 表示最短， 5 表示最长。 
电池品牌 价格 （元） 寿命长短顺序
双鹿 2.50  
威益 0．50  
超霸 2.20  
王牌战士 0.75  
久量 1．00  
 
3、“电池价格越大，质量越好。”你同意这句话吗？请在选项上划√ 
a)同意   b）不同意    c) 不一定 
 
4、“电池使用寿命越长，质量越好。”你同意这句话吗？请在选项上划√ 




 因素 不重要 重要 很重要看牌子或看广告    
看价格    
听营业员的建议    












8、经检测 A 电池的寿命是 B 电池的 4 倍，请你选择并划√ 
a) A 电池的质量这么好，即使价钱超过 B 电池的 4 倍，我也愿意 
b)如果 A 电池的价钱也是 B 电池的 4 倍，我愿意 
c)物美还应价廉，如果 A 电池的价钱低于 B 电池 4 倍，我才愿意 
d)与其买 1 节贵的，还不如买 4 节便宜的 
 
9、你对在旅游景点所售卖的电池的质量和价格有何评价？请划√，可多选： 
a) 价格高   b) 寿命短   c）价格便宜  d）没经历过或没注意 
e）寿命和在其他常规地点买的差不多
 
